Moral judgments express our values, but not all expressions of values are also moral judgments. The expression of preference is the expression of some value we hold. When we say that we prefer to listen to jazz, we are stating a preference that has no moral implication. When we say that we prefer playing golf to being at work, we may be saying that we regard our leisure activities more highly than our work activities, but such a statement is rarely categorical and often relates simply to a point in time. It is no different than someone stating that family is the most important thing in their life, yet not spending time with family members because of other timely considerations such as earning a living. Instrumental values, such as having a job, coexist with intrinsic values such as loving the members of your family, and only collide when a decision must be made related to what is valued most.
Consider again the allegation against Raphael Smith. Does he value position and power and status over integrity and honesty?
The highest reach of injustice is to be deemed just when you are not.”
Plato, the Republic
Just as some individuals may be deemed just when they are not, the opposite of Plato’s admonishment may also hold true—that someone is deemed unjust when, in fact, they have made an ethical decision that is not fully understood or viewed favorably by others. Quite often this is related shared values—how they are understood and how they are perceived to have been honored or dishonored.
Instrumental Value
When something has instrumental value, that usually means it is only valued as a means to achieve some other end which is more important. An example might be a television set, which is valued for its ability to bring us information and entertainment.
Intrinsic Value
When something has intrinsic value, it is valued for what it is. Commonly intrinsic values have a strong relationship with basic human needs, emotions or belief systems. Examples are honesty, love, and safety.
Educators know that instrumental value can coexist with intrinsic value. They see it every day. For example, “understanding science” can be an instrumental value when it helps us to achieve something by scientific method, and an intrinsic value to someone who has a natural curiosity and love of science. This is an important point in decision making in the education system.
Many educators and policy makers hold the belief that education holds instrumental value. “You need a good education to get a good job” is common rhetoric and the education system is dominated by policies and practices based on this point of view. Others hold the belief that education holds intrinsic value. By seeking knowledge and understanding we become complete, capable of articulating great thoughts and experiencing meaning in life. The debate between educators begins at the entrance to the school. What should we teach? Why should we teach it? How should we measure learning? The answers to these questions are all influenced by the type of value placed on education by the respondent.
Reflect for a moment on your belief about education. Is the value instrumental or intrinsic? Like most educators, you will probably respond, “both.” In that case, which value type do you lean more toward?
As humans we can consciously and logically assimilate the value proposition, but subconsciously we will have a predisposition to one argument or the other. Some will consider their approach more practical, in making decisions that guide educators and students toward the application of education, while others will make decisions that give greater weight to the act of learning and the intrinsic value of knowledge.
Rationalizing Values
One problem in understanding ethics is that it seems that everything we value is something which leads to some other value. Perhaps there is no “final” value or set of values and we are caught in a constant feedback loop where things we value continually lead to other things we value. Some philosophers argue that at least some intrinsic values exist objectively and independently of any observation. Our only role is in recognizing the intrinsic value when it matters. This leads to the concept of rationalization, when we might deny that something is of value by deceiving ourselves or simply being mistaken. Some ethical theorists argue that moral problems could be resolved if we could simply learn to better recognize those things which have true value and dispense with artificially created values which distract us.
While this examination of the philosophy of value may seem academic or moot, consider its implications in the Raphael Smith scenario. If Ralph simply understood that being honest was an intrinsic value at a higher level than the instrumental value of a job promotion, would he have acted differently? Was he rationalizing, or simply mistaken in his beliefs? The answer to that question is the same as to the question of why we need shared values. If enough people share the same value, in this case honesty, then it is elevated in society to a higher level than the instrumental value of the promotion. Ralph would be aware of this, even if he did not share the same value. He would know that he was making a choice that is rejected by the majority of others and we would know that he has either chosen to reject the shared value, or rationalized his action. In either case he would know that there are consequences and we can set aside the argument that he was simply mistaken in his understanding of the intrinsic value of honesty. A moral judgement of Ralph’s actions is therefore an expression of common values.